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CROSS-BORDER TRUST DISPUTES AND CHOICE OF
LAW IN EAST ASIA
Ying Khai Liew
Abstract: Since its introduction in East Asia over a century ago, trust law
has seen much development, refinement, and domestic transformation.
However, the treatment of trusts in private international law is severely
underdeveloped. Due to the lack of comprehensive and dedicated choice of law
rules in East Asia regarding trusts, there is much uncertainty in how forum
courts treat cross-border trust disputes. This treatment derogates from a proper
recognition of the trust as a distinctive legal device and fails to properly protect
the autonomy and legitimate expectations of certain parties. Worse still, it puts
East Asia out of step with most jurisdictions that actively use trusts. This is a
regrettable situation in an increasingly globalized world, where incidences of
cross-border trust disputes are on the rise. Ultimately, legislators in East Asian
jurisdictions ought to consider enacting or reforming their choice of law rules
to develop a comprehensive set of trust rules based on the Hague Trusts
Convention.
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INTRODUCTION
Domestic trust law has flourished tremendously in Japan, the
Republic of Korea (“Korea”), the Republic of China (“Taiwan”) and the
People’s Republic of China (“China”). Since the enactment of the Japanese
Trust Act of 1922, other East Asian jurisdictions have enacted trust
legislation, including the Korean Trust Act of 1961, the Taiwanese Trust
Act of 1996,1 and the Chinese Trust Act of 2001.2 There has also been an
overhaul and reform of trust law in Korea (the Korean Trust Act of 2006)3
and Japan (the Japanese Trust Act of 2011).4
Today, the trust industry in these jurisdictions thrives. For example,
in 2019, Japanese trust banks, which accounted for 23.5% of all Japanese
banks, held 256.7 trillion yen (approximately USD 2.33 trillion) in funds;5
in 2020, Chinese trust companies held 21.33 trillion yuan (approximately
USD 3.28 trillion) worth of assets.6 And in Korea, the value of assets held
in trust in 2020 amounted to more than one quadrillion South Korean won
(approximately USD 0.85 trillion).7 In addition to the commercial context,
the domestic use of trusts is also growing exponentially, primarily for
family planning, wealth management, or as will substitutes.8
In stark contrast to the success of domestic trust law stands the
private international law aspect of trusts, which is severely underdeveloped.
In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, there is a complete absence of specific choice
of law rules that are applicable to cross-border trust disputes. The general
assumption by legal scholars in these jurisdictions seems to be that trust
disputes can be adequately dealt with by using the existing categories of
1

Trust Law of the Republic of China (“Taiwan Trust Act”).
Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China (“China Trust Act”).
3
Trust Act of the Republic of Korea (“S. Kor. Trust Act”).
4
Trust Act of Japan (“Japan Trust Act”).
5
See L. Kettenhofen, Value of Trust Bank Funds in Japan from Fiscal Year 2010 to 2019, STATISTICA
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1172624/japan-value-of-trust-bank-funds/.
6
See China’s Trust Industry Reports Higher Revenue Growth in Q1, THE STATE COUNCIL, THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 13, 2020), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/statistics/202006/13/
content_WS5ee47dacc6d0a6946639c00f.html.
7
See Stock Market Trends, KOREA FIN. INVEST. ASS’N, http://freesis.kofia.or.kr/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2021).
8
See, e.g., Masayuki Tamaruya, The Transformation of Japanese Trust Law and Practice: Historical
Contexts and Future Challenge, in ASIA-PACIFIC TRUSTS LAW, VOL. 1: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
CONTEXT (Ying Khai Liew & Matthew Hardings eds., 2021); Ying-Chieh Wu, Private Trusts as a De
Facto Private Foundation and its Practical Usage in Korea, in ASIA-PACIFIC TRUSTS LAW, VOL. 2:
ADAPTATION IN CONTEXT (Ying Khai Liew & Ying-Chieh Wu eds., forthcoming 2022); Jian Qu, Trusts
and the Chinese Civil Code: Toward a New Era of Codification, 27 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 82 (2021)
(discussing the codification of trusts in China).
2
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choice of law rules found in each jurisdiction’s Private International Law
Act (PILA), 9 such as those concerning contract, property, tort, unjust
enrichment, and so on. The same assumption may also explain the law in
China. In a lone provision, the Chinese PILA10 provides for choice of law
rules applicable to trusts. However, due to its brevity and its limited
applicability, the assumption seems to be that the rules applicable to other
categories of case can fill in any gaps. But this assumption is flawed. The
lack of a comprehensive and dedicated set of choice of law rules for trusts
distorts a proper understanding of trusts law and frustrates the autonomy
and legitimate expectations of parties to a trust. This situation is troubling.
Because cross-border movement will only grow and the global commercial
sector thrives on cross-border activity, the lack of dedicated trust choice of
law rules seriously hampers the utility of trusts.
In assessing the law in East Asia, this paper analyzes the choice of
law rules in the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on
their Recognition (referred to throughout the article as “the Convention”).
This paper ultimately suggests that the four East Asian jurisdictions (Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and China) should develop comprehensive choice of law
rules based on the Convention. The need for producing the Convention was
raised by civil law jurisdictions, not common law jurisdictions, particularly
those whose domestic law had no concept equivalent to trusts.11 The reason
is evident: those jurisdictions require guidance on how to deal with trusts
in cross-border disputes. Surprisingly, few civil law jurisdictions—indeed,
few jurisdictions at all—are signatories to the Convention. 12 Insofar as
common law jurisdictions are concerned, the lack of interest in the
Convention can be explained on the basis that the Convention does not
offer any substantial advantage over existing common law trust choice of
law rules because they are substantively similar in important respects.13
9

Japan Act No. 78 (“Japan PILA”); English translations are sourced from Kent Anderson and
Yasuhiro Okuda, Translation of Japan’s Private International Law: Act on the General Rules of
Application of Laws [Hō no Tekiyō ni Kansuru Tsūsokuhō], Law No. 10 of 1898 (as newly titled and
amended June 21, 2006) 8 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POLICY J. 138 (2006). Korea: Act No. 6465 of 2011
(“Korea PILA”); English translations are sourced from Kwang Hyun Suk, New Conflict of Laws Act of
the Republic of Korea, 1 J. OF KOREAN L. 197 (2001). Taiwan: Act Governing the Choice of Law in Civil
Matters Involving Foreign Elements (“Taiwan PILA”).
10
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheheguo Shewai Minshi Falvguanxi Shiyongfa, Law of the Application of
Laws over Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of China (“China PILA”).
11
See David Hayton, Reflections on the Hague Trusts Convention After 30 Years, 12 J. OF PRIVATE
INT’L L. 1 (2016).
12
Jurisdictions where the Convention is in force are Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Malta, Cyprus,
and the UK (jurisdictions with common law influences); Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco,
Netherlands, Panama, San Marino, and Switzerland (jurisdictions with civil law influences). The
Convention has been signed, but not ratified, by France and the United States. For an up-to-date status
table, see https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=59.
13
See Richard Garnett, Identifying an Asia-Pacific Private International Law of Trusts, in ASIAPACIFIC TRUSTS LAW 381 (Ying Khai Liew & Matthew Harding eds., 2021); David Hayton, Reflections
on The Hague Trusts Convention After 30 Years, 12 J. OF PRIVATE INT’L LAW 1, 2 (2016).
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The lack of interest in many civil jurisdictions without trust law is also
understandable. Unless the jurisdictions regularly deal with trust issues in
cross-border litigation—an unlikely situation in non-trust jurisdictions—
there is no real impetus to adopt the Convention. After all, the prospect of
importing an unknown foreign institution 14 is surely daunting, if not
overwhelming. In contrast, it is surprising that civil law jurisdictions that
have a mature law of trusts, such as the East Asian jurisdictions, lack
enthusiasm for adopting a comprehensive, dedicated set of trusts choice of
law rules.
Of course, the Convention is not the only regime that is open to the
East Asian jurisdictions to adopt. Other templates include the trusts-related
rules under the American Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws15 or the
Uniform Trust Code.16 But the Convention was designed specifically with
the interest of civil jurisdictions in mind. For example, trusts to which the
Convention applies are defined17 to accommodate the sort of “obligational
trusts” 18 recognized in East Asia. The Convention also contains safety
valves that assuage concerns that the East Asian jurisdictions may have in
adopting foreign trust practices.19 For these reasons, this paper argues that
the Convention is an excellent reference point for East Asian jurisdictions
to enact or reform their choice of law rules.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Part One sets out two
yardsticks which will be used to evaluate the existing choice of law rules
in East Asia. Parts Two, Three, Four, and Five scrutinize those rules, and
each Part examines a specific aspect that causes certain difficulties. Part
Six addresses the concerns that East Asian jurisdictions may have about
the Convention. Part Seven concludes by recommending the adoption of
dedicated trust choice of law rules based on the Hague Trusts Convention.
I.

YARDSTICKS

In East Asia, as is the case in most choice of law regimes, the rules
which apply to cross-border disputes are matters solely for the forum.20 For
this reason, the mere fact that East Asian jurisdictions apply different rules
14

Kurt Lipstein, Trusts, 3 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPAR. LAW 23 (1994). See also Lionel Smith,
Stateless Trusts, in The Worlds of the Trust 89, 99 (Lionel Smith, ed. 2013).
15
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAW § 10 (AM. L. INST. 1971).
16
UNIF. TR. CODE § 107 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
17
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trust and on Their Recognition, art. 2, July 1, 1985
[hereinafter Convention on Law Applicable to Trust].
18
See generally, Hayton, supra note 13.
19
Convention on Law Applicable to Trust, art. 2.
20
That is, the law of the jurisdiction where the court action takes place. See O. Kahn-Freund, General
Problems of Private International Law, 4 THE MODERN L. REV. 753 (1978). See also China PILA art. 8;
JUN YOKOYAMA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN JAPAN 64 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2019);
Rong-Chwan Chen, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and the Recognition of Foreign Judgments in Taiwan,
in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN MAINLAND CHINA, TAIWAN AND EUROPE 19, 30 (2014).
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to resolve cross-border trust disputes, as compared to their common law
counterparts or signatories to the Convention, is neither here nor there. This
is because variances in the laws of different jurisdictions on the same issue
are commonplace and unremarkable. Nevertheless, this paper seeks to
demonstrate that the adoption of such a view causes difficulties for a proper
treatment of trusts.
To explain this point properly, this Part develops two important
yardsticks against which the existing approaches in East Asia can be
measured. The first yardstick touches on the trust aspect, specifically the
extent to which existing choice of law rules maintain and promote trusts as
a distinctive legal device. The second touches on the private international
law aspect, specifically the extent to which those rules protect and enhance
the autonomy and legitimate expectations of the parties to the trust.
A.

The Distinctiveness of the Trust

The concept of “dual ownership,” which is often thought to be
central to explaining the common law trust,21 is foreign to civilian legal
thought. Thus, the Trust Acts in East Asia define the trust without reference
to equity or the notion of ownership. Each Trust Act stipulates that a trust
is an arrangement created when a settlor transfers property or entrusts his
property rights to a trustee. This trustee is responsible for administering or
disposing of the property for the benefit of a beneficiary or, more generally,
to achieve a specified purpose.22
Defined as such, it is easy to fall into the error of thinking that there
is nothing distinctive about the trust. Since a contract may easily provide
for such arrangements, the “majority thesis in East Asia”23 is that the trust
is a kind of contract. Support for this view may also be found in the civil
law method of thinking, by which strict legal categorization is fundamental.
The infrastructure of civil private law “is rooted in the Roman-Germanic
basis, which adopts dichotomous system in respect of the private law
dealing with property: the law of property and that of obligation.”24 All
four East Asian jurisdictions subscribe to the numerus clausus principle,25
21

See, e.g., Tony Honoré, Trusts: The Inessentials, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 7 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003); George Gretton, Trusts without
Equity, 49 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 599, 600 (2000).
22
Japan Trust Act art. 2(1); S. Kor. Trust Act art 2.; Taiwan Trust Act art. 1; China Trust Act art. 2
23
See Ying Chieh Wu, East Asian Trusts at the Crossroads, 10 NAT’L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 79, 81–
82 (2015).
24
Id. at 81.
25
Minpō [Minpō] [Civ. C.] art. 175 (Japan); Minbeob [Civil Act] art. 185 (S. Kor.); Minguo Xianfa
art. 757 (Taiwan); Wuquanfa art. 5 (China); see Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus
Clausus Principle, Property Customs, and the Emergence of New Property Forms 100 IOWA L. REV.
2275, 2301 (2015). The numerus clausus principle is the principle that there is an exhaustive list of
property rights recognizable by the law.
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and no jurisdiction has ever explicitly recognized a beneficiary’s interest
under a trust as a right in rem.26 This might appear to lend support to the
view that a beneficiary’s right is simply contractual and that the trust is
simply a kind of contract.
However, to conceive of a trust as nothing distinctive, is a mistake.
One main reason is that East Asia trusts can be created not only by way of
contract, but also by will (in all four jurisdictions) and by way of selfdeclaration (in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan). 27 As Wu has convincingly
demonstrated, a contractual analysis is thoroughly unsustainable when it
comes to testamentary trusts and self-declared trusts.28 A trust created by
will comes into being only upon the testator’s death; it follows that there
is no counter-party for a valid contract. As for self-declared trusts, one
cannot contract with oneself. These two points indicate that the trust is not
simply a subset of contract law.
A second reason is that numerous provisions in these four
jurisdictions’ Trust Acts are wholly incompatible with the characterization
of the beneficiary’s rights as being simply in personam in nature.29 These
include, for example, provisions securing the independence of the trust
property, 30 the right to rescind dispositions in breach of trust, 31 the
continuity of the trust despite the trustee’s death or bankruptcy,32 and the
right of a sole beneficiary to the trust property upon termination.33
A third reason is that the Trust Acts of all four jurisdictions provide
a comprehensive set of mandatory and default rules which apply only to
trusts, and no other—even closely analogous—relationship, such as
agency, mandate, or contracts. This supports the view that the trust is a
26

Wu, supra note 23, at 106–07. A right in rem, which approximates to a “property right,” means a
property right recognizable by the law.
27
Japan Trust Act art. 3; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 3; Taiwan Trust Act art. 2; China Trust Act art 8. Note,
however, that in Taiwan only charitable trusts can be created by self-declaration, subject to strict
restrictions (Taiwan Trust Act art. 71). Note also that Art. 8 of the China Trust Act states that trusts can
be created by “other documents”; but adding this clause is commonplace in Chinese statutes, and in the
trusts context no “other documents” have been recognized as capable of creating trusts. See Lusina Ho
et al., Trust Law in China: A Critical Evaluation of its Conceptual Foundation, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 81 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., 2013).
28
Wu, supra note 23, at 84–85.
29
See, e.g., Lusina Ho, The Reception of Trust in Asia: Emerging Asian Principles of Trust?, SING. J.
LEGAL STUD. 287, 300 (2004); Masayuki Tamaruya, Transformation of Trust Ideas in Japan: Drafting
of the Trust Act 1922, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2229 (2013) (detailing that an in personam right approximates
to a “personal right”).
30
Japan Trust Act art. 16–18; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 22–27; Taiwan Trust Act ch. II; China Trust Act
art. 15–16. The preservation of the independence of trust property in the Chinese Trust Act is a crucial
attribute which signifies the uniqueness of the Chinese trust despite the fact that Art. 2 of the Chinese
Trust Act enables a trust to be created even where a settlor retains ownership of the trust property. See
Ho et al., supra note 27, at 85–88.
31
Japan Trust Act art. 27; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 75; Taiwan Trust Act art. 18.; China Trust Act art. 22.
32
Japan Trust Act art. 75; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 23–24; Taiwan Trust Act art. 45; China Trust Act art.
52.
33
Japan Trust Act art. 182; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 101; Taiwan Trust Act art. 65; China Trust Act art.
54.
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distinctive legal institution.
The fact that the trust is a distinctive legal device becomes even
clearer when seen from an historical perspective. The first Trust Act
enacted in the region, the 1922 Japanese Trust Act, “was shaped by the
extensive use of English and American treatises and case law, the
Californian Civil Code and the [Indian Trust Act],” and hence “[t]he
concept of trust that the Trust Act embraced was unmistakably based on
the common law.” 34 Indeed, “in 1921 the trust concept meant for most
lawyers across the world the common law trust.”35 And when the 1922 Act
inspired Korea, Taiwan, and China to construct their own laws, “the
[common law] trust was imported into [those jurisdictions] via Japan.”36 It
is therefore unsurprising that, as Masayuki Tamaruya has incisively
observed, “[d]espite the civil law scholars’ herculean efforts [to elucidate
the nature of the trust], one can perceive the sense of resignation that fitting
the trust idea into a neat conceptual model is an unattainable task.”37
However, one might object, positing that domestic law arguments
are irrelevant for the purposes of private international law. It is well
accepted that the exercise of characterization38 for private international law
purposes, while undertaken according to the law of the forum (lex fori),
need not mirror domestic legal categories—the exercise of characterization
is a functional exercise. 39 The potential objection, therefore, is that the
uniqueness of the trust in domestic law does not demonstrate the need for
choice of law rules to recognize, let alone protect, the uniqueness of the
trust institution.
There is no basis for this objection, however, because “although
characterization in private international law need not mirror domestic
34

Stelios Tofaris, Trust Law Goes East: The Transplantation of Trust Law in India and Beyond, 36 J.
LEGAL HIST. 299, 324 (2015).
35
D.W.M. Waters, The Future of the Trust: Part I, J. INT’L TR. 179, 211–12 (2006).
36
Wu Ying-Chieh, Trust Law in South Korea: Developments and Challenges, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN
AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 46–47 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., 2013); CHANG YUN-CHIEN,
CHEN WEITSENG & WU YING-CHIEH, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN TAIWAN 113 (2017); see also
Masayuki Tamaruya, Japanese Law and the Global Diffusion of Trust and Fiduciary Law, 103 IOWA L.
REV. 2229, 2246–47 (2018); Yamada Akira, Sintak rippo katei no kenkyu [Study on the Process of
Legislation on Trusts], in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 97 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca
Lee eds., 2013).
37
Tamaruya, supra note 29, at 203(112). For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to speculate
how best the trust should be conceptualized in East Asia. But note that Wu suggests that the doctrine of
separate patrimony provides the best plausible analysis. Wu, supra note 23, at 108.
38
That is, the determination of the legal category or categories within which the facts of a case fall,
for the purpose of applying the choice of law rule or rules that are applicable to that category or categories.
39
See, e.g., TIONG MIN YEO, CHOICE OF LAW FOR EQUITABLE DOCTRINES 71 (2004); GEORGE
PANAGOPOULOS, RESTITUTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (Colin Harvey ed., 2000); ZHENG
SOPHIA TANG, YONGPING XIAO & ZHENGXIN HUO, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 30, 284 (2016); Weizuo Chen & Gerald Goldstein, The Asian Principles of Private International
Law: Objectives, Contents, Structure and Selected Topics on Choice of Law, J. OF PRIV. INT’L L. 411,
421 (2017); Walter Wheeler Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 457, 458–
70 (1923–1924); Wight v. Eckhardt Marine GmbH [2003] UKPC 37.
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categories of case, the classifications under domestic law exert a highly
persuasive influence at the conflicts level.” 40 On the one hand, because
forum courts determine the applicable choice of law rules, judges, when
determining that issue, cannot be completely detached from the domestic
law analysis of the type of claim in question. The one always affects the
other.41 On the other hand, the choice of law rules that forum courts apply
have the real possibility of directly affecting the health or status of
domestic law. This is particularly pertinent where the domestic law in
question can facilitate cross-border activity; the trust is not a purely
domestic device. In East Asia, a trust’s primary domain is the commercial
arena;42 and commercial life attracts and thrives on cross-border activity.
A vigorous set of trust choice of law rules may facilitate and encourage the
development of the outward-facing aspects of trust law, through ensuring
certainty and predictability where cross-border trust disputes occur.43 This
increases confidence in, and the usage of, domestic trust laws, and
increases the attraction of foreign investment in the region.
In sum, the first yardstick by which East Asian choice of law rules
can be assessed is the extent to which they recognize and promote the
distinctiveness of the trust.
B.

Autonomy and Legitimate Expectations

The trust, like a contract, is a facilitative device made available for
people to “realis[e] their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to
create, by certain specified procedures and subject to certain conditions,
structures of rights and duties within the coercive framework of the law.”44
The provision of private law facilitative devices is an expression of the
state’s commitment to recognizing and protecting personal autonomy. It
also allows individuals to have the freedom to use such facilities to achieve
their aims or goals.45 If the protection of autonomy is one side of a coin, its
flipside is the protection and vindication of legitimate expectations. If the
law allows individuals the freedom to use facilitative devices, it follows
40

Adeline Chong, The Common Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and Constructive Trusts, 54
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 855, 861 (2005).
41
This point has also been made in East Asia. See, e.g., YOKOYAMA supra note 20, at 65; Zhengxin
Huo, An Imperfect Improvement: The New Conflict of Laws Act of the People’s Republic of China, 60
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1065, 1075 (2011).
42
See Tamaruya, supra note 8 (Japan); Chang, Chen & Wu, supra note 36, at 47; Chang, Chen &Wu
supra note 36, at 113; Ho et al., supra note 27, at 79–82.
43
A similar point has been made in relation to the Taiwanese PILA more generally: “It is beyond doubt
that the provisions of the [PILA] on international contracts, torts, property rights and family relationship
played an important role in supporting the ties of international trade, cross-border tourism and
transnational marriage.” See generally Chen, supra note 20.
44
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27–28 (2nd ed. 1994).
45
See Ying Khai Liew, Justifying Anglo-American Trusts Law, 12 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 685
(2021).
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that these individuals can expect legal effect to be given to legitimate
choices made within the bounds of the relevant facilitative device.
The enhancement of personal autonomy and the protection of
legitimate expectations also inform the choice of law rules which relate to
domestic facilitative devices. In relation to the protection of autonomy, this
can be detected in the East Asian jurisdictions’ choice of law rules for
contracts, 46 the Chinese choice of law rules for trusts, 47 and the
Convention,48 which allows the relevant parties to choose the governing
law. In relation to the protection of legitimate expectations, an influential
paper written by Max Rheinstein in 1945 is instructive.49 There, Rheinstein
argued that the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the main
rationales of any choice of law rule. 50 In particular, “one of those
expectations is that we ought not to be subjected to punishment, liability or
other legal detriment for conduct which we had good reason to believe
would not subject us to such troubles,”51 as would be the case if a dispute
were to be decided “under a law whose application would take the parties
by surprise.” 52 There is good reason to think that there ought to be
consistency between autonomy and expectations, certainly in relation to
facilitative devices. Thus, contractual freedom is matched by the freedom
of the parties to select the governing law of their contract, the choice of
which, if not generally respected, would “take the parties by surprise.” The
same ought to be the case in relation to trusts.
The enhancement of autonomy and the protection of legitimate
expectations, taken together, form the second yardstick. Thus, for example,
the law would detract from these rationales if the parties that create a trust
expressly or impliedly select a governing law, but the trust is categorized
as a contract in some cases or as a form of property in others. Another
example is where a settlor chooses a governing law to apply to a specific
aspect of the trust, but this law is essentially overridden by the forum’s
courts due to the choice of law rules employed: this would detract from the
enhancement of autonomy and protection of legitimate expectations,
unless such overriding is otherwise justified by, for example, public policy
considerations.
II.

46
47

CHARACTERIZATION

Japan PILA art. 7; S. Kor. PILA art. 25(1); Taiwan PILA art. 20(1); China PILA art. 41.
Japan Trust Act art. 182; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 101; Taiwan Trust Act ch. VII; China Trust Act art.

54.

48
49
50
51
52

See Convention on Law Applicable to Trust, art. 6.
Max Rheinstein, Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1945).
Id. at 17–24.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
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To assess the choice of law rules that may be applicable to crossborder trust disputes, it must first be noted that all four East Asian
jurisdictions follow the classical methodology for determining the
applicable law.53 This classical methodology provides that the forum court
must first categorize or characterize the dispute at hand and then deduce
the connecting factor prescribed by the relevant category. This section
considers the issue of characterization, and Part Three considers
connecting factors.
Under the Convention, clear guidance is given as to the issue of
characterization: “legal relationships created—inter vivos or on death—by
a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the control of a
trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose”54 and
“created voluntarily and evidenced in writing”55 will be characterized as a
“trust.” Article 2 further clarifies that:
A trust has the following characteristics:
(a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not
a part of the trustee’s own estate;
(b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the
trustee or in the name of another person on
behalf of the trustee;
(c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect
of which he is accountable, to manage, employ
or dispose of the assets in accordance with the
terms of the trust and the special duties imposed
upon him by law.
Because this definition of a “trust” does not strictly reflect the
common law concept of “equitable ownership,”56 there is no doubt that a
significant majority of trusts, presently recognized in East Asia, would fall
within its ambit. This is likely to be true even in China, where the curiously
drafted Article 2 of the Trust Act defines a trust as arising where a settlor
“entrusts” property rights to the trustee—a provision which has caused
much uncertainty as to whether the trustee must have title to the trust assets.
A Chinese trust established without transfer of trust property to the trustee
still fits the Convention, as it involves “assets … placed under the control
53

See YOKOYAMA, supra note 20, at 64–65; Hongsik Chung, Private International Law, in
INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN LAW 271, 283 (Korea Legislation Research Institute ed., 2013); Chen, supra
note 20, at 30 (discussing the Taiwan Supreme Court’s decision Tai-Kang 165 of 2005); Huo, supra note
41, at 1075.
54
See Convention on Law Applicable to Trust, art. 2.
55
See Convention on Law Applicable to Trust, art. 3.
56
DAVID J. HAYTON ET AL., UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
100.51, 100.58 (13th ed. 2016).
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of a trustee.”57 It may well be said that title to the trust assets is “in the
name of [the settlor] on behalf of the trustee.”
In East Asia, however, the issue of characterization is not
straightforward. The reason for this, insofar as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
are concerned, is that their PILAs make no specific provision for trusts. In
China, a specific provision is made for trusts, but as discussed below, this
provision is far from comprehensive and creates similar characterization
issues.
A.

Trusts Created by Contract (“Trust Contracts”)

As a matter of first impression, courts in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
are likely to assume that trusts created by contract attract choice of law
rules pertaining to contracts. This is consistent with the prevailing view
that domestic trusts are a kind of contract. In the case of China, the
dedicated trusts choice of law rules in Article 17 of the Chinese PILA58 are
likely to be assumed to be applicable.
However, because domestic and choice of law legal categories need
not mirror one another, these characterizations are not a foregone
conclusion. In the case of China, the highly influential view that a trust is
a contract59 may lead courts to characterize a trust as a contract for choice
of law purposes. Another possibility in all four jurisdictions is to
characterize a trust dispute as concerning property. This characterization is
consistent with the occasional—but potentially misguided—analysis that,
in East Asian civil jurisdictions, trust beneficiaries have a right in rem over
trust funds. 60 It is also possible that a trust created by contract almost
always involves the creation or acquisition of real rights, at two points in
time at least. The first is when the settlor transfers trust assets to the
trustee.61 The second is upon termination of the trust, when residual trust
assets will vest in the beneficiary, the settlor, or such persons as provided
for in the trust instrument.62 Moreover, this characterization may follow if
a trust dispute is conceptualized as a dispute to determine the title or
ownership of the relevant property.

57
Rebecca Lee, Conceptualizing the Chinese Trust, 58 INT’L & COMPAR. Q. 655, 662 (2009) (quoting
Convention on Law Applicable to Trusts, art. 2).
58
Japan Trust Act art. 182; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 101; Taiwan Trust Act ch. VII; China Trust Act art.
54.
59
See Lee, supra note 57, at 659–62; Ho et al., supra note 27, at 87–88.
60
See Wu, supra note 23.
61
Even in China, “in practice an overwhelming majority of Chinese trusts do involve the transfer of
trust property to the trustee.” Ho et al., supra note 27, at 86.
62
Japan Trust Act art. 182; S. Kor. Trust Act art. 101; Taiwan Trust Act ch. VII; China Trust Act art.
54.
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Trusts Created by Will (“Testamentary Trusts”)

In East Asia, the Trust Acts recognize that not all trusts are created
by contracts. But when we move away from the notion of trusts as contracts,
the instinct to apply the contract characterization becomes less
compelling. 63 In relation to China, it also becomes impossible to apply
Article 17 of the Chinese PILA. That provision states:
The parties concerned may choose the laws applicable to trust
by agreement. If the parties do not choose, the laws at the
locality of the trust or of the fiduciary relation shall apply.
The phrase “may choose … by agreement” is a translation of “协议
选择,” which implies a discussion between the relevant parties from which
a consensus is achieved.64 Thus, Article 17 is applicable only where there
is a contract, it cannot apply where there is none.
Testamentary trusts are likely to be characterized as relating to
succession, since a testamentary trust increases or decreases the portion of
the testator’s estate from which an individual will inherit. However, for the
reasons below, this is not a foregone conclusion.
The first reason concerns the nature of the property in question. In
the Chinese PILA, Article 31 provides that the succession of immovable
property is governed by the lex situs.65 Although the distinction between
movable and immovable property for the purpose of succession choice of
law rules is not explicitly drawn in the other three PILAs, it has been
suggested that in Japan, succession of immovable property is also governed
by the lex situs. 66 In any case, where the lex situs is applied, the
testamentary trust is characterized as a matter of property, as opposed to
succession. The property characterization also becomes more likely to be
applied if East Asian courts take their role in a testamentary trust dispute
as being to identify the rightful owner of the deceased’s immovables.
The second reason arises due to the interrelationship between
succession and wills choice of law rules. In the Chinese PILA, a bright line
is drawn between “statutory succession” (which includes intestate
succession) and “testate succession” (which involves a will).67 This may
suggest that testamentary trusts always fall within the latter set of rules, but
matters may not be this straightforward. In China, as well as in Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan, where such a distinction is not drawn, a will does not
63
64
65
66
67

See Wu, supra note 23.
I thank Hui Jing for bringing this to my attention.
That is, the law of the place where the property is situated.
YOKOYAMA supra note 20, at 343.
China PILA, art. 31 (intestate succession), arts. 32–33 (testate succession).
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govern all aspects of succession matters relating to the deceased’s property.
A clear example is forced heirship,68 to which a will must yield. When it
comes to testamentary trust disputes, it may be difficult to determine
whether the case falls within the succession or wills provisions.69
The problem does not end there. The Japanese and Taiwanese PILAs
contain a category of choice of law rules applicable to “juridical acts.”70
Given that the execution of a will is a juridical act, it may be possible to
characterize a testamentary trust as a “juridical act” for choice of law
purposes.71
C.

Created by Self-Declaration (“Self-Declared Trusts”)

As previously mentioned, in Japan and Korea, and Taiwan to a more
limited extent,72 trusts may be created by self-declaration. That is, settlors
can constitute themselves trustees for the intended beneficiaries. For
choice of law purposes, a property characterization may be appropriate due
to the reasons discussed earlier, namely on the basis that beneficiaries have
in rem rights in trust assets, or on the basis that real rights are acquired or
transferred when a trust terminates. But the former basis is likely to be
theoretically unsound, as discussed earlier, and the latter basis may
flounder where, when the dispute arises, the trust is nowhere near its end.
Alternatively, self-declared trusts may attract the choice of law rules
relating to juridical acts.
D.

Breach of Trust

Regardless of the means by which a trust is created, three other
possibilities arise where the dispute concerns an alleged breach of trust. It
may be possible for the courts to characterize a claim as concerning unjust
enrichment or negotiorum gestio73 (for example, where the claim concerns
an errant trustee making a personal profit) or tort74 (for example, where the
claim concerns a breach of trust causing a loss to the trust fund) for choice
of law purposes, depending on the nature of the alleged breach.
68

On which see discussion in Part 6.2. below. Forced heirship is a statutory scheme of mandatory
distribution of a deceased’s estate.
69
Japan PILA art. 36 (succession), art. 37 (wills); S. Kor. PILA: art. 49 (succession), art. 50 (wills);
Taiwan PILA: art. 58 (succession), art. 60 (wills).
70
Japan PILA art. 7–8; Taiwan PILA art. 20. “Juridical acts” are acts which are expressions of a
person’s will that are intended to have legal consequences. The Korea PILA contains rules concerning
the formal validity of “juridical acts,” but none which govern their essential validity. The China PILA
contains no specific rules concerning juridical acts.
71
See, e.g., YOKOYAMA, supra note 20, at 360.
72
See Ho et al., supra note 27.
73
These are discussed in Section III.A below.
74
This is discussed in Section III.B below.
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Uncertainty in Characterization

As the discussion above illustrates, there are various ways in which
East Asian courts may characterize a cross-border trust dispute. The variety
of options, coupled with the fact that there is an absence of guiding
principles, causes concern.
On the one hand, the difficulty in characterizing a trust dispute
detracts from the protection of autonomy and the vindication of legitimate
expectations. The freedom of parties to select the applicable law is
significantly curbed if the parties are unable to know what to expect in
terms of the choice of law. To treat what was intended as a trust as
something else, for choice of law purposes, fundamentally disappoints the
legitimate expectations that the device was to be treated as a trust.
On the other hand, by characterizing trusts as something other than
a trust, East Asian private international law is out of sync with the approach
adopted by jurisdictions that are most active on the international trust scene.
These are jurisdictions that also take a similar approach to the choice of
law issue, given that they are usually common law jurisdictions and/or
signatories to the Convention. This provides a disservice to the distinctive
nature of the trust, both domestically and globally. It detracts from the
central objective of the exercise of characterization, namely “harmony of
decision wherever the case is heard.”75
There is also the potential knock-on effect of discouraging
individuals and companies from entering into trust relationships which
relate to or utilize the laws of the East Asian jurisdictions. This is because
these parties are unable to foresee how those forum courts might resolve
the choice of law question were a cross-border dispute to arise.
III.

CONNECTING FACTORS

The differences in characterization would be inconsequential if these
distinctions were simply different paths to the same applicable law. Yet,
this is far from the case. Each of these categories have substantively
different connecting factors. 76 Apart from causing a disservice to the
protection of party autonomy and legitimate expectations, this diminishes
the distinctiveness of the trust. As Tiong Min Yeo notes, “[c]hoice of law
categories … are intended to bring together problems which, because of
their similarity, ought to share the same connecting factor.” 77 By
characterizing the trust as something other than a trust for choice of law
purposes, East Asia jurisdictions send the unfortunate message that a trust
75
76
77

YEO, supra note 39, 3.04.
A connecting factor is that which links a legal category or issue with a particular legal system.
YEO, supra note 39, 3.09.
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is not a distinct concept that ought to be treated in a unitary manner.
Part Three discusses the connecting factors applicable to the
categories of succession and wills, property, juridical acts (which includes
contracts), and Chinese “trusts.” Unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio,
and tort will then be scrutinized in Part Four, as these categorizations are
relevant in a narrower range of trust claims, namely when there is a breach
of trust claim.
A.

Succession and Wills

In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the connecting factor for succession
and wills is the testator’s lex patriae (nationality). However, the point in
time at which nationality is determined differs. This point in time may be
at the time of death for succession or at the time of execution for wills. In
China, the applicable law to succession is the testator’s habitual residence
at the time of death and the lex situs for immovables. For wills, it is the
habitual residence at the time of death or the testator’s lex patriae. Thus,
the connecting factors for succession and wills are not identical.
Both categories, will and succession, do not provide the proper
scope for testators to select the law applicable to their testamentary trust.
But there is no reason to deny testators the autonomy to do so, as giving
effect to an express choice does not appear to introduce any amount of
instability or difficulty in ascertaining the applicable law. In situations
where the lex patriae is applied, this also denies the distinctiveness of the
trust by treating testamentary trusts as entailing nothing more than
succession or family law, when in reality a trust is a flexible device that
may be of relevance beyond any existing a succession or family-related
aim. The same problem arises where a distinction is made between
movables and immovables. This fragmented approach detracts from
recognizing a trust as a distinctive institution, which applies regardless of
the nature of the trust assets.
All the above can be contrasted with the Convention, which provides
latitude to settlors (including testators) to exercise autonomy. Their express
or implied choice of governing law will normally take effect, unless the
chosen law does not recognize the specific trust or type of trust.78 In the
absence of a choice, the applicable law is the law with which the trust, not
the testator, has the closest connection—a rule consistent with the
distinctive nature of the trust. In addition, under the Convention, the
relevant point in time is clear. This is the time the testator executes the will,
whether in relation to an express or implied governing law of choice79 or
78

See Convention on Law Applicable to Trust, art. 6.
In the Estate Constantinou [2012] QSCR 332 (Austl.); see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 56, at
100.146.
79
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in relation to the law with the closest connection to the trust. 80 This
approach is adopted to provide certainty and protect the expectations of the
testator.81 These key considerations may be overlooked if the relevant time
used is the time of the testator’s death.
B.

Property (Rights in Rem)

In relation to property, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan reflect a similar
approach: the connecting factor for both movable and immovable property
is the lex situs of the subject matter. 82 In China, the same position is
adopted in relation to immovables, movables attract the lex situs rule when
the parties have not agreed on a governing law.83
In the context of trust disputes, these approaches are problematic for
three reasons. First, with the limited exception in China, a property
characterization denies settlors the autonomy to choose the governing law.
This contrasts with the position under the Convention, where an express
choice of governing law by the settlor generally takes effect, even if it
differs from the lex situs. This approach “places a higher currency on
settlor autonomy than on the risk of unenforceability overseas.”84
Second, even in the absence of an express choice, the property
characterization overemphasizes the lex situs at the expense of other factors.
Consider the position under the Convention. On the one hand, when
determining whether there is an implied choice of law under Article 6,
“[t]he situs of the assets may be an important factor where the bulk of the
trust property is immovable. However, where movable property is
concerned, the situs appears to be a relevant, but not especially important
factor.” 85 Ultimately, the basal criterion is the settlor’s subjective
intention86 and the lex situs is important only insofar as it sheds light on
that criterion. Thus, the Convention better protects the legitimate
expectations of the parties rather than simply using the property
characterization. On the other hand, absent an express or implied choice of
law, Article 7 provides that the applicable law is the law with which the
trust is most closely connected, with particular reference made to:
a)

80

the place of administration of the trust designated by
the settlor;

HAYTON ET AL., supra note 56, at 100.153.
See In the Estate Constantinou [2012] QSCR 44 (Austl.); HAYTON ET AL., supra note 56, at 100.153.
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Japan PILA art. 13; S. Kor. PILA art. 19; Taiwan PILA art. 38.
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China PILA art. 36–37.
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HAYTON ET AL., supra note 56, at 100.137.
85
LAWRENCE COLLINS ET AL., DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Adrian
Briggs et al. eds., 2018).
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the situs of the assets of the trust;
the place of residence or business of the trustee;
the objects of the trust and the places where they are to
be fulfilled.87

The lex situs is merely one of these four non-exhaustive criteria.
Moreover, the lex situs is not necessarily a particularly weighty factor:
“[t]he situs of the assets of the trust may deserve little weight: the movables
included in a trust are usually intangible, e.g., stocks, shares, and bonds;
and the situs of an intangible movable is to some extent a fiction.”88 By
not according the lex situs undue weight, the Convention better recognizes
the distinctiveness of the trust. Trust law is not a matter of property law per
se but is a unique legal institution that should be taken when applying the
close connection test.
Third, the lex situs approach is practically problematic. As David
Hayton notes, 89 it is increasingly common for inter vivos trusts to be
created where its assets are initially of nominal value, only for substantial
assets to be added later as accretions to the fund. In relation to testamentary
trusts, the trust fund often contains assets across multiple jurisdictions. In
these cases, the lex situs is not an important factor. To give undue weight
to the lex situs in these cases would be to impose an outcome that does not
align with the legitimate expectations of the settlor when creating a trust
and of the beneficiary who does not expect the trust to be treated as a matter
of property, even for choice of law purposes.
C.

Juridical Acts (Including Contracts)

As observed above,90 Japan and Taiwan have dedicated choice of
law rules governing the essential validity of “juridical acts” in their PILAs.
This category is absent in Korea and China. Instead, the latter two
jurisdictions make explicit reference to contract choice of law rules,91 a
category absent in Japan and Taiwan. These two phenomena are related:
entering into a contract is undoubtedly a juridical act. Therefore, in Japan
and Taiwan, the “juridical acts” category is intended to cover contracts.
One upshot of this strategy, insofar as trusts are related, is that the more
widely crafted “juridical acts” category can, in addition to trust contracts,
include testamentary trusts. This is because the execution of a will is also
a juridical act. In the following discussion, the generic label “juridical acts”
87
88
89
90
91

See Convention on Law Applicable to Trust, art. 7.
COLLINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 29–121.
Hayton, supra note 13, at 13.
See Japan PILA art. 7–8; Taiwan PILA art. 20.
S. Kor. PILA art. 25; China PILA art. 41.
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refers to the choice of law rules for that category (including contracts and
wills) in Japan and Taiwan, as well as contract rules in Korea and China.
Structurally, all four jurisdictions share a similar approach. Parties
are free to choose the governing law, and in the absence of a choice, a close
connection test applies. The same structure is adopted in the Convention.
However, important differences exist between the rules in the East Asian
jurisdictions and compared to the Convention.
1.

Party Choice

Of the four jurisdictions, only the Korean PILA92 makes specific
mention of giving effect to express and implied choice of law. The terms
of the Japanese and Chinese PILAs are non-specific. 93 While Japanese
courts have given effect to implied choices,94 the position in China remains
unclear.95 Taiwan strictly recognizes express choices only.96
To the extent that express choices carry the day, the position in East
Asia, just as under the Convention, 97 protects and enhances party
autonomy. But where implied choices of law are denied, there is a
derogation from party autonomy. It is not clear why a choice—not stated
in so many words, but which clearly reflects the actual intention of the
parties—is not given effect.98
There are two subtle, but important, differences between the regimes
in East Asia and the Convention. First, where the juridical acts choice of
law rules are engaged as a result of characterizing a trust as a contract, it is
the bilateral intention of the parties as expressed in their contract which
matters, rather than the unilateral intention of the settlor as under the
Convention. Where a trust is created by way of contract, there is almost
invariably an overlap between the parties’ bilateral intention and the
settlor’s unilateral intention. Nevertheless, confounding unilateral and
bilateral intention erodes the distinctiveness of the trust by failing to
recognize the distinction between trusts and contracts. Second, the
Convention provides a limitation that is absent in East Asia: an express
choice is disregarded if the law chosen does not recognize trusts. This is a
92

S. Kor. PILA art. 25(1).
Japan PILA art. 7; China PILA art. 41.
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See YOKOYAMA, supra note 20, at 133 n.120.
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But see GUANGJIAN TU, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA 142 (2016) (saying yes); TANG,
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Taiwan PILA art. 20(2); see also David J.W. Wang, The Revision of Taiwan’s Choice-of-Law Rules,
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International Law in Taiwan, in CODIFICATION IN EAST ASIA 233, 241 (Wen-Yeu Wang ed., 2014).
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consequence of the fact that, while all established legal systems have
contract law, not all of them recognize trusts. Without such a rule, however,
the juridical acts choice of law rules fail to recognize the distinctiveness of
the trust.
2.

Absence of Party Choice

Of the four jurisdictions, there is an affinity of approach between
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, where there is no selection of the governing
law.99 In these jurisdictions, the most closely connected law governs, with
two presumptions applying. First, where there is a characteristic
performer, 100 this performer’s habitual residence (Japan and Korea) or
domicile (Taiwan) is presumed to be the law with the closest connection.
Secondly, where the juridical act concerns immovable property, its lex
situs is presumed to be the most closely connected law. In China,101 the
governing law is the law of the characteristic performer’s habitual
residence, or the law most closely connected with the contract.
It is convenient to first deal with China’s position, where the
problem with the approach is easily stated. The principles of characteristic
performance and closest connection are given equal footing. However,
both principles will not always yield the same applicable law. Thus, it is
impossible to predict on which principled basis the courts would determine
the applicable law.102
As for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, their approach is similar to the
position under the Convention, which also utilizes a close connection test.
But there are fundamental differences. First, unlike the Convention, which
provides a non-exhaustive list of factors of special importance, the three
PILAs contain no specific guidance. This causes uncertainty in relation to
trust disputes, which upsets the parties’ legitimate expectations.
Second, it is true that the two presumptions are simply presumptions,
in that they will not apply if the juridical act in question is obviously more
closely connected with a different law.103 However, it is implicit in the
nature of presumptions that courts will not rebut an otherwise applicable
presumption unless the “closeness” of the connection with a different law
is significant. This suggests that the presumptions would be applied far
more frequently than not, which gives rise to the risk of “applying the
99

Japan PILA art. 8; S. Kor. PILA art. 26; Taiwan PILA art. 20.
The “characteristic performer” is the party who undertakes substantial performance under the
contract (excluding an undertaking simply to pay money).
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China PILA art. 41.
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See Zhengxin Huo, An Imperfect Improvement: The New Conflict of Laws Act of the People’s
Republic of China, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1065, 1086 (2011); TANG, XIAO & HUO, supra note 39, at
8.55.
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‘wrong’ law, which is a law with little connection” to the trust.104 This is
liable to disappoint the legitimate expectations of the parties to a trust.
Third, in relation to the principle of characteristic performance, there
is little doubt that this refers to the theory, found (inter alia) in the
European Union Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation. According to
this theory, the party who undertakes simply to pay money, is disregarded
and the connecting factor is crafted around the other party who undertakes
substantial performance. 105 When applied in the trust context, it
immediately runs up against the problem of fragmentation. The
characteristic performance test is applicable, if at all, only to contracts and
is capable of dealing only with trust contracts and not testamentary or selfdeclared trusts. This fragmented approach detracts from the recognition of
the trust as a distinctive institution. Even in relation to trust contracts, the
characteristic performance test is inapplicable because that test focuses on
the parties’ bilateral intention while a proper analysis of trusts should
concern only the settlor’s unilateral intention. Of course, with some
analytical gymnastics, it is possible to say that the characteristic performer
is the trustee, since it is the trustee who administers the property to carry
out the purpose of the trust.106 Even then, the position is different from
Article 7 of the Convention, where one of the relevant factors to be
considered is “the place of administration of the trust designated by the
settlor.” 107 As Jonathan Harris explains, 108 “the place of administration
would not be worthy of such a lofty place in the hierarchy of Article 7 if it
were to include cases where nothing was said on the matter by the settlor …
[W]here the place of administration … is not specified[,] … [it] does not
manifestly merit a rank above e.g. the situs of the assets.”
Fourth, the singling out of immovables for application of the lex
situs presumption gives rise to difficulties in the trusts context. It is
inconsistent with the view that the trust is a distinctive institution, whose
core features and characteristics do not differ according to the type of
property held on trust. It is also likely to disappoint the legitimate
expectations of settlors, who would not have expected that different choice
of law rules might apply depending on the nature of the trust property. In
contrast, the Convention does not prescribe differing approaches according
to the nature of the property, an approach which is consistent with the
distinctive nature of the trust.

104

HARRIS, supra note 97, at 216.
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“Trusts” in the Chinese PILA

In the Chinese PILA, Article 17 specifically provides choice of law
rules for trusts. As previously noted, this provision does not sufficiently
deal with all trusts. On its terms, Article 17 applies only to trusts that are
based on an agreement or consensus between the settlor and trustee. Thus,
it is applicable only to trust contracts, and cannot apply to testamentary
trusts which are not agreement-based trusts. This again results in a
fragmented approach towards trusts choice of law rules and detracts from
the distinctive nature of the trust.
In relation to trust contracts, Article 17 allows parties to choose the
applicable law. The difficulties with this approach are the same as those
discussed in relation to juridical acts above. As discussed earlier, it is
unclear whether an implied choice of law will be given effect; and if it is
not given effect, it is unclear why not. In addition, Article 17 looks to
bilateral intention while a trust is concerned with the settlor’s unilateral
intention. Moreover, and a choice of law is not disregarded if the law
chosen does not recognize trusts. These difficulties pose problems for the
protection of party autonomy and legitimate expectations of parties to a
trust.
In the absence of a choice of law, Article 17 provides that the
governing law is the law “at the locality of the trust or of the fiduciary
relation.” But it is impossible to predict how courts will choose a governing
law if the trust’s locality and the locality of the fiduciary relationship point
to different applicable laws. Furthermore, these two options provide “hard
and fast connecting factors” and “[g]iven the complexity of the disputes
arising out of trusts, … such a rigid arrangement may be problematic.”109
The flexible, but principled, approach provided for by Article 7 of the
Convention better protects legitimate expectations.
IV.

BREACH OF TRUST

Once the trust is characterized as falling within one of the categories
discussed above (contract, property, or succession, etc.), it might be
thought that the applicable law selected will also govern the trustee’s
liability for breach of trust. However, where a breach of trust is the main
dispute in question—that is, when the claim arises specifically where the
beneficiary seeks redress against an errant trustee—it is possible for courts
to characterize the dispute in three other, additional ways: unjust
enrichment, negotiorum gestio, and tort.

109
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Unjust Enrichment and Negotiorum Gestio

A trustee commits a breach if they exploit a trust opportunity (the
“trust opportunity” case) or sell trust information (the “trust information”
case) for personal gain. In a claim by a beneficiary against the trustee for
wrongfully obtained money, a court might classify the case as one of unjust
enrichment or negotiorum gestio. The unjust enrichment characterization
is consonant with the domestic laws in East Asia, which essentially provide
that a party must return an enrichment obtained at another’s expense
without legal cause if the latter suffers loss or prejudice.110 Given that each
domestic Trust Act removes the requirement for “loss,” trustees must
disgorge wrongfully obtained profits even if the trust suffers no
corresponding loss. 111 Thus, in trust opportunity and trust information
cases, it is possible that a claim for disgorging gains against a trustee might
be understood as a claim for unjust enrichment. On the other hand, the
negotiorum gestio characterization is consonant with an understanding of
the trust opportunity case as one of “quasi negotiorum gestio,” that is, a
case where “the principal [i.e., the beneficiary] is entitled to deem the
person as having used the opportunity for the principal’s interest and
proceed to assert that the managing person [i.e. the trustee] should be
personally liable to return the profit.”112 The status of quasi negotiorum
gestio is unclear in East Asian domestic law,113 particularly because of the
difficulty of analyzing an opportunity which could not have been exploited
for the trust’s benefit114 as having been used “for the principal’s interest.”
However, the Trust Acts in East Asia dispense of the need for loss in a
claim for disgorgement of profits, and this may be taken to dispense of the
need to establish a clear deprivation of benefit. Thus, it is possible for such
cases to be characterized as relating to negotiorum gestio.
Choice of law rules for unjust enrichment and negotiorum gestio in
the four East Asian jurisdictions differ widely. In Japan, the applicable law
for both categories is the law of place where events causing the claims
occurred.115 In Korea, it is the law of the place where the enrichment and
110
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management took place, or the law governing the legal relationship if the
enrichment or management is effected on the basis of a legal
relationship.116 Taiwan follows the Korean approach, with the exception
that the “legal relationship” exception applies only to unjust enrichment
and not to negotiorum gestio.117 And in China, the parties may choose the
governing law by agreement; if an agreement is absent the law of their
common habitual residence applies, and where there is no common
habitual residence the law of the place of the enrichment or management
will govern.118
Characterizing a breach of trust claim as concerning unjust
enrichment or negotiorum gestio significantly threatens settlor autonomy
and the legitimate expectation that the governing law of the trust will
govern the consequences following a breach of trust. In all jurisdictions
except China, there is no room for parties to choose the governing law.
And even in China, a choice takes effect only if it specifically relates to the
enrichment or negotiorum gestio, rather than to the trust relationship
itself.119 Similarly, in Korea and Taiwan, settlor autonomy is not protected.
Since the enrichment or management will not be within the scope of the
trustee’s duties, the enrichment or management cannot be said to arise “on
the basis of a legal relationship”. Therefore, it is not possible to apply the
law of the parties’ relationship to protect the parties’ autonomy.
Moreover, there is also a disservice done to the distinctiveness of the
trust. Most applicable connecting factors are enrichment- or managementspecific. Applying those connecting factors overlooks the fact that the
wrongfulness of a trustee’s gain is not freestanding or due to a lack of legal
basis, but instead is wholly grounded in the preexisting trust relationship
between the trustee and the beneficiary. Treating enrichment or
management in isolation for choice of law purposes fails to recognize the
distinctiveness of the trust.
B.

Tort

In certain situations when a beneficiary claims compensation against
the trustee for breach of trust, the case may be characterized as a tort claim
for choice of law purposes. Examples include cases where a trustee
wrongly misappropriates trust property or causes a loss through the
negligent management of trust property. Characterizing these cases as tort
claims may be consistent with the Civil Codes in East Asia, which provide
that a person who intentionally or negligently infringes upon a right of
116
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others is liable for damage caused.120
In the four East Asian jurisdictions, the starting point for
determining the governing law is the lex loci actus (the law of the place
where the act causing the tort occurred) or, in the case of Japan, the lex loci
delicti (the law of the place where damage occurs).121 These are merely
starting points, since their PILAs also provide other connecting factors
under specific circumstances. These include the law of the place of the
parties’ common habitual residence (Korea, China); a governing law the
parties have agreed to after the event (Korea, China); the close connection
test (Taiwan); or the lex loci actus (Japan). Here, no room is given for an
ex-ante choice of governing law to apply.
Perhaps more alarming is the potential for a tort characterization to
unduly prejudice beneficiaries with a money claim against their trustee
under a foreign common law. In the four East Asian jurisdictions, recovery
in tort by application of a foreign law is exclusively limited to types of
damages recognized by domestic law. 122 Therefore, a beneficiary’s
recovery can be limited unnecessarily.
According to common law, there are two distinct types of
compensatory claims a beneficiary may bring against a trustee for breach
of trust.123 The first type of claim is a “substitutive performance” claim. It
arises where the trustee misappropriates trust assets. Where trust assets are
misappropriated, the beneficiary has a continuing right in the trust assets,
and therefore may compel the trustee to specifically restore the
misappropriated assets to the trust (i.e., restoration in specie). When this is
not possible—for example where the assets can no longer be recovered—
the trustee is liable to effectuate “substitutive performance.” The award
here is a money payment, measured by the current objective value of the
assets the trustee ought to have restored to the trust fund at the date of
judgment. The theory behind this award is that the trustee’s ongoing duty
to hold the assets in trust does not evaporate simply due to
misappropriation. The second type of claim is a “reparation” claim, which
is a claim for loss compensation. Unlike a substitutive performance claim,
the sum for which the trustee is liable depends on the extent to which the
trustee had caused a loss to the beneficiary. Causation and remoteness of
loss must be proved in a reparation claim for the beneficiary to succeed.
The situation is different in East Asia. According to all four East
120
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Asian Trust Acts, a beneficiary only has two kinds of remedy against a
trustee who misappropriates trust property: restoration of the property to
its original condition, or pecuniary compensation where restoration is
impossible or impracticable. 124 In common law terms, only reparation
claims are recognized. Thus, for cases resulting in a substitutive
performance award, an East Asian court might bar the recovery of that sum
or limit the award to the amount of loss which the beneficiary can prove
was caused by the trustee.
Limiting the beneficiary’s claim disappoints the settlor’s and
beneficiary’s legitimate expectations. Where a trust is properly established,
the settlor and the beneficiary can legitimately expect that the trustee will
deal with the trust assets precisely, as provided by the trust instrument.
Moreover, limiting the beneficiary’s claim detracts from the
distinctiveness of the trust by failing to hold trustees to the high standards
required to protect the institution of the trust. Barring substitutive
performance claims may encourage trustees to misappropriate trust assets
for selfish ends based on the hope that they may not have to repay the full
objective value of the assets. And that amount may well fall short of the
objective value of the assets. For example, fortuitous intervening events,
multiple sufficient causes of the loss, or an unskilled lawyer acting for the
plaintiff all might lead to the inability to prove causation of loss equivalent
to the objective value of the misappropriated trust property.
C.

The Solution Under the Convention

The solution under the Convention is straightforward. Article
11(3)(d) of the Convention establishes that the beneficiary’s right against
the trustee for breach of trust is governed by the law applicable to the trust.
Using the law applicable to the trust to determine the trustee’s liability for
breach is not only consistent with the settlor’s legitimate expectation, but
also consistent with the inherent nature of a breach of trust. A trustee
commits a breach of trust by acting inconsistently with the terms of the
trust instrument, as supplemented by statutory, mandatory, or default rules,
and the awarded remedy aims to put things right by reference to the trust.
The intertwinement between the trust itself and a claim for breach of trust
suggests that they ought to be treated by the same applicable law.
V.

SCOPE
In the East Asian jurisdictions, once the applicable law is determined
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by a category of choice of law rules, there is no limit to the scope of that
law’s applicability to the trust dispute at hand. 125 This approach is not
nuanced enough and overreaches its application to trust disputes in two
significant respects as discussed below. The point is best made by
comparing the positions of East Asian jurisdictions to the Convention.
A.

Rocket Launcher versus Rocket

Under the Convention, a distinction is drawn between “preliminary
issues relating to the validity of wills or of other acts by virtue of which
assets are transferred to the trustee,”126 to which the Convention does not
apply, and the trust itself once in existence, to which the Convention does
apply. This distinction is commonly illustrated by the imagery of a rocket
launcher and rocket.127 Matters pertaining to “rocket launching,” such as
the substantive and formal validity of transfers from a settlor to the
trustee, 128 are determined by the forum’s choice of law rules. Matters
pertaining to the “rocket”—the trust—are governed by the Convention.
This distinction is absent in the four East Asian jurisdictions, meaning that
the applicable law will apply to the trust dispute, from start to finish.
The East Asian PILAs do not distinguish between rocket launcher
and rocket. This might seem unremarkable, since it is arguably “more
coherent for a single law to determine whether a trust has come into
operation.”129 However, it is crucial to draw such a distinction if the law is
to properly recognize the trust as a distinctive institution which exists only
if the preconditions for its existence are fulfilled.
One aspect of this, which applies to all four East Asian jurisdictions,
concerns testamentary trusts. It is clear that the formalities for a valid
will130 must be complied with before a testamentary trust is validly created.
If choice of law rules apply to the relevant category of case in question, it
follows that rules concerning wills ought to apply to determine the validity
of wills, but not to a trust. Another aspect concerns the preliminary matter
of the settlor’s capacity to deal with his property. It seems that property
choice of law rules ought to determine this matter, leaving the proper law
125
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of the trust to govern issues concerning the trust once properly set up.131
A further aspect concerns the transfer of trust property from settlor
to trustee. As observed above, in China, a transfer is not strictly necessary
for a trust to be created. Conversely, in Taiwan, the Supreme Court has
held132 that it is necessary for a trust to be created, insofar as trust contracts
are concerned. The position in Japan and Korea is more ambivalent. While
the Korean Trust Act is silent on the matter, the Japanese Trust Act
provides that “[a] trust … become[s] effective when a trust agreement is
concluded between the [parties].” 133 But it is arguable that, in both
jurisdictions, a transfer is necessary for a trust to be created. Thus, Article
2 of the Korean Trust Act contemplates that a trust is a legal relation which
arises where the settlor “transfers a specific piece of property” to the trustee;
and Article 2(1) of the Japanese Trust Act contemplates a trustee
“administer[ing] or dispos[ing] of property,” which surely presupposes a
transfer. Moreover, the rights and duties of settlors, trustees, and
beneficiaries found in the Trust Acts presuppose that the trust property is
already in the trustee’s name; they cannot apply in any meaningful sense
until and unless the trust property is transferred to the trustee. If this is
correct, then in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, property choice of law rules
should apply for the transfer of trust property and the proper law of the
trust should determine questions about the trust once properly established.
In sum, the lack of dedicated trusts choice of law rules in East Asia
means that there is no distinction made between the rocket launcher and
rocket, and this represents a failure to recognize the distinctiveness of the
trust and to treat it as such for the purposes of private international law.
B.

Third-Party Liability

The approach in East Asia is also not nuanced enough to deal with
issues of third-party liability, as distinct from the liability of trustees.
Article 11(3)(d) of the Convention provides for the recovery of trust
assets against an errant trustee. However, that subsection contains the
proviso that “the rights and obligations of any third-party holder of the
assets shall remain subject to the law determined by the choice of law rules
of the forum.” Where one of the four East Asian jurisdictions is the
forum,134 the applicable choice of law rules are those relating to property,
that is, the lex situs. Therefore, if the property is located in a common law
jurisdiction, then the beneficiaries will be recognized “as having equitable
131
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proprietary interests binding everyone except bona fide purchasers of the
full legal title without notice of the equitable interest.”135 If the property is
in a civil jurisdiction, then “third parties will take free from the rights of
beneficiaries though they may be subject to some civil law remedies in
respect of fraud or unjust enrichment as provided by the law determined
by the choice of law rules of the forum.”136 And if the property location is
in one of the four East Asian jurisdictions, then the beneficiaries may also
rescind the transaction between the trustee and the third party under certain
circumstances provided for under the Trust Acts.137
The East Asian PILAs, however, make no distinction between
trustee and third-party liability. The result is that third-party liability is
likely to be determined using the same law as determined by the choice of
law rules applied to the trust. For example, if a trust contract provides that
English law is the governing law, then any third-party volunteer who
receives trust property may be compelled to give it up, even if the property,
the third party, or the third party’s receipt of the property are all located or
occur in a civil jurisdiction. This is troubling because it overlooks the thirdparty’s legitimate expectations. 138 A third-party located in a civil
jurisdiction would normally expect to keep their property and would be
caught off-guard if English law was taken to apply and hence would
deprive them of that property. This is even more concerning given that
drafters of the Convention “had in mind specifically claims to recover trust
property from banks, although the provision is not so limited.”139 If the
application of choice of law rules risk volunteer banks being compelled to
give up trust assets received in good faith without knowledge of the trust,
then it is equally detrimental to cross-border commercial activity.
VI.

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE CONVENTION

The previous discussion demonstrates that the state of affairs of
choice of law rules applicable to cross-border trust disputes in East Asia is
far from ideal. East Asian jurisdictions should look to the Convention as a
starting point for answers. This section addresses the suitability of the
Convention in providing the basis for constructing a comprehensive set of
trusts choice of law rules. It responds to two previously raised concerns
regarding the Convention and civilian legal thinking, which may cause
hesitancy in East Asian jurisdictions.
The East Asian jurisdictions are not simply faced with a binary
135
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choice: to adopt the entire Convention, or not. The experience of other
jurisdictions indicates that the Convention may be adopted with
modifications,140 or its key principles may be incorporated into the forum’s
law.141 Part Six demonstrates that the Convention’s provisions provide a
starting point for constructing a comprehensive set of trusts choice of law
rules.
A.

Autonomy Overkill?

One concern is whether a settlor’s choice of governing law will be
respected by using the Convention as a starting point.142 This concern has
been raised by Lionel Smith, the Sir William C. Macdonald Professor at
McGill University, who argues that because trusts have significant effects
on outside parties, the principle of freedom of choice of law may not be
suitable. 143 Smith argues that although the Convention purports not to
concern itself with third parties or the proprietary effects of trusts, it
remains that the recognition of a trust entails recognizing its effects on third
parties. 144 For example, trust assets are not part of the trustee’s own
estate145 and the trustee’s personal creditors have no recourse against the
trust assets.146 Given the effects of recognizing a trust, Smith concludes
that “it is not at all clear why full settlor autonomy as to governing law [is]
thought to be appropriate.”147
Though Smith’s concern is a legitimate one when a non-trust
jurisdiction is in issue, it falls away in East Asia. The four jurisdictions
have already enacted Trust Acts. Because those statutes already recognize
the independence of trust property in domestic law, the adoption of settlor
autonomy as the starting point in choice of law rules does not entail
importing a foreign concept, at least insofar as the independence of trust
property is concerned.
As previously discussed, the trust is undoubtedly a facilitative
device whose availability within a legal system reflects the state’s
recognition of property owners’ autonomy to deal with their own
property.148 Unless there is good reason to the contrary, it seems logical
and consistent for a legal system to adopt a principled approach of granting
property owners the freedom to create trusts and to choose the governing
140
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law. After all, the same consistency is already found in relation to the
facilitative device of the contract, which grants the parties the freedom to
choose the governing law. In addition, it is important to stress that the
Convention does not take settlor autonomy as an immutable principle: it is
only a starting point.149 Thus, recognizing settlor autonomy does not lead
to “autonomy overkill” in East Asia.
B.

Civilian Legal Thinking

Civilian legal thinking differs fundamentally from its common law
counterpart in important respects. That difference comes to a head in
relation to the question of trust transplantation. Given that the trust as
traditionally understood is a characteristically common law device, many
aspects of the trust potentially trespass on core civilian legal principles.
The compromise achieved in the East Asian Trust Acts to reconcile
tensions from differences in legal thinking has received wide coverage in
contemporary comparative trusts literature.150 Concerns may be raised as
to whether the Convention’s provisions are consistent with civilian legal
thinking. To that end, the below discussion addresses three key differences
and the ways in which these are mitigated through “safety values” in the
Convention.
The first aspect concerns the discoverability of rights affecting
property. The notion that a beneficiary’s interest under a trust can be
hidden from plain sight is offensive to civilian legal thinking, where
transparency of rights is paramount. The discoverability principle is
reflected in two closely related legal features: the requirement of
registration of rights,151 and the non-enforceability of rights against third
parties in the absence of necessary registration. Both legal features are
retained and reflected in the Trust Acts of the four East Asian jurisdictions.
Thus, they all provide that the existence of a trust over registrable property
trust must be registered in the relevant public register. If such registration
is not completed, the trust remains valid between trustee and beneficiary,
but cannot be enforced against third parties.152
Given the centrality of the discoverability principle to civilian legal
thinking, East Asian jurisdictions would likely not allow the registration
requirement or the enforceability of trusts against third parties to be
overridden by the application of a foreign law. The Convention contains
safety valves which preserve the forum’s sovereignty in relation to these
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matters. In relation to the registration requirement, Article 12 153 makes
clear that the trustee’s ability to register a trust is not precluded by the rules
contained in the Convention. Moreover, Article 15, which allows for the
application of mandatory rules of the forum, would allow East Asian
jurisdictions to require registration as a precondition to third party
enforceability. 154 All this is complemented by Article 11(3)(d), which
provides that the forum’s choice of law rules will govern “the rights and
obligations of any third-party holder of the assets.”
The second aspect concerns forced heirship. Forced heirship is a
typical and often sacred feature of civil jurisdictions, where freedom of
testation is much more restricted than its common law counterparts.
Trusts—particularly those created by will—have the potential to infringe
forced heirship rules, something which the East Asian jurisdictions will
find contentious. Reliance on three “safety valves” in the Convention
provides strategies to avoid such infringement. First, part of Article 4
provides that the Convention does not apply to “preliminary issues relating
to the validity of wills.” Forced heirship rules can be conceptualized as
concerning the preliminary question of whether the property in question
can be subjected to a trust at all or not, therefore falling outside the scope
of trusts choice of law rules and within those involving succession. 155
Second, forced heirship rules can be treated as mandatory rules which,
according to Article 16, “must be applied even to international situations,
irrespective of rules of conflict of laws.” Third, forced heirship can be
conceptualized as concerning public policy such that the otherwise
applicable trusts provisions may be disregarded by virtue of Article 18. In
Japan, the latter strategy finds support in case law from a 2018 Tokyo
District Court decision that “clarified that forced heirship constitutes the
public order under the Japanese law of succession.”156
The third aspect concerns constructive trusts. It is trite that
“constructive trusts” is a label used to describe a wide range of discreet
situations (or “doctrines”) in which such trusts may arise by operation of
law in common law jurisdictions and is not a unitary concept.157 In relation
to a number significant doctrines, Ying-Chieh Wu has emphatically
demonstrated that they are not recognized as trusts (or proprietary-rights
generating) in civil jurisdictions.158 Among the doctrines Wu surveys are
constructive trusts arising in the context of: tracing-related proprietary
153
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claims against third party recipients, trustees making a profit in breach of
their fiduciary duties, specifically enforceable contracts of sale, secret
trusts, mutual wills, and the “common intention constructive trust,” (CICT)
which arises in the family homes context.159 However, influential authors
have suggested that the constructive trusts arising in the above situations
may fall within the ambit of the Convention, provided the “voluntariness”
and “writing” prerequisites of Article 3 are met by the facts of the case.160
This may be a source of worry in East Asia, whose courts could be
unwilling to allow these constructive trusts to be enforced domestically
simply because an express choice of law term is included in relevant
documents. This is also covered by a “safety value” in the Convention.
Article 13 provides:
No State shall be bound to recognise a trust the significant
elements of which, except for the choice of the applicable law,
the place of administration and the habitual residence of the
trustee, are more closely connected with States which do not
have . . . the category of trust involved.
Adopting Article 13161 would mean that an East Asian court would
not be obliged to recognize a constructive trust if the significant elements
of the constructive trust are more closely connected with the forum. This
would hold true even if the settlor expressly chooses a common law
jurisdiction as the governing law.
CONCLUSION
Trust law has seen much development, refinement, and
transformation in East Asia since it was first introduced in the region a
century ago. In contrast, trusts have been neglected in the private
international law sphere. Due to the lack of comprehensive and dedicated
trust choice of law rules in East Asia, there is much uncertainty in how
forum courts are likely to treat cross-border trust disputes. This situation
159
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derogates from a proper recognition of the trust as a distinctive legal device
and fail to properly protect both the autonomy and the legitimate
expectations of the parties. Worse still, it puts East Asia out of step with
most trusts-active jurisdictions which have developed dedicated trusts
choice of law rules. This is a regrettable situation in our increasingly
globalized world, where incidences of cross-border trust disputes will only
increase. Serious thought ought to be given by the legislators of the East
Asian jurisdictions to enact or reform their choice of law rules to develop
a comprehensive set of trusts rules based on the Convention.

